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JURIMETRICS
The Next Step Forward
LEE LOEVINGER*
T IS ONE of the greatest anomalies of modem tames that the

law, which exists as a public guide to conduct, has become
such a recondite mystery that it is incomprehensible to the public and scarcely intelligible to its own votaries. The rules which
are supposed to be the guides to action of men living in society
have become the secret cult of a group of priestly professionals.
The mystic ritual of this cult is announced to the public, if
at all, only in a bewildering jargon. Daily the law becomes more
complex, citizens become more confused, and society becomes

less cohesive. Of course, people do not respect that which they
can neither understand nor see in effective operation. So the
lawmongers bemoan the lack of respect for law. Now the lawyers
are even bewailing the lack of respect for lawyers.
Many remedies are proposed Wre must have better law enforcement-that is, more policemen to make the people obey
the laws they do not understand. We must have a great moral
renascence-presumably some sort of mystical process which will
enable people intuitively to apprehend the mysteries of law. We
need better education---catch 'em young, and teach them to respect the law while they're still credulous and uncritical. We
ought to pass a new law to make people respect the old lawsignorance of the law is no excuse, even for lawyers. We need
better "public relations" between the lawyers and the publicwhich simply means that the lawyers want to advertise like
everybody else. There is a school of support for every proposal
except the one that it is the law itself which needs to be changed.
Copyright, 1949, by Lee Loevinger, Minneapolis Minnesota.
*Member of the Minnesota Bar.
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Apparently it has never occurred to the professional disciples of
the subject that the trouble with law is not the public but the
lawyers, that what is needed is not publicity but progress.
More than one popular writer has suggested that our system
of administering law is far from good.1 This charge is usually
answered by the bar either by impugning the critic's motives or
his competence. Being a layman, the poor fellow obviously doesn't
understand these things. However, I want to suggest, in all seriousness, that it is the bar itself which lacks understanding. The important matter for understanding is not the mechanics of the
law, but the human problem which it is the business of the law
to solve, and the actual results which are achieved. Failure in
these matters can be observed even by the untrained eye. There
is a growing conviction that the collective competence of the legal
profession is inadequate to the tasks imposed upon it (or assumed
by it) in contemporary society It is no sufficient answer for
the bar association to pass complacent resolutions that the lawyers
are really fine fellows at heart, the difficulty being that the public
doesn't understand them.
As a matter of fact this sensitiveness of the profession to criticism suggests an uneasy presentiment that perhaps there is something wrong. It has not been seriously suggested that the individual
members of the legal profession, in general, lack either personal
ability or integrity Law usually attracts men of intelligence, and
it takes a fair amount of ability to get admitted to the bar and to
succeed in the practice. It is well known that the supervision of
the courts, in most places, maintains a standard of conventional
honesty considerably higher than prevails in business, and at least
equal to that of any other profession. The criticism that is leveled
at lawyers implies no personal fault beyond that of supporting,
or accepting without protest, a system that is archaic and insufficient for modem needs.
Indeed, were the lawyers themselves but slightly more introspective they would be the first to see the appalling shortcomings
of their own concepts and methods. The truth is that on most
fundamental legal questions, including the relatively simple matter
of defining law itself, the profession is in hopeless confusion and
disagreement. Study of this basic problem of defining the field is,
1. E.g., Robert Rurak, Divorce Laws Are "Stupid," Minneapolis Tribune, Dec. 3, 1948, p. 6. Among Mr. Rurak's pungent comments are these
"Being a naive type, I thought everybody had recognized by now that the
divorce machinery is man's finest monument to the pointless stupidity of man.
And it is certainly a beautiful testimony to the cynicism of bench and bar."
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in fact, most illuminating-not as to the definition of law, but as
to the source of confusion.
The numberless authorities who have considered the subject
have, at various times, written that law is the dictate of God, of
Nature, of Reason; that it is Justice, Equality, Liberty, custom,
command, rules, decisions; that it is found in the will of a personal sovereign, of the people, of the legislature, in the decisions
of the courts, and in the words of the judges. Supreme Court Justices have disagreed from the bench as to what "la" is, and there
are shelves of thick books in every law library, marked "Jurisprudence," devoted principally to the problem of defining the term.
So far as we can go back in history, the same arguments and
ideas recur. In prehistoric times social restraint apparently rested
on custom, and there was no conscious "law," at least in anything
like the modem sense.2 Our earliest glimpses of conscious law,
which go back to the Code of Hammurabi, about 2000 B. C., indicate that it was probably thought of as representing the direct
commands of the gods, received and transmitted through the reigning monarch.3
The first thoughtful consideration of legal and social problems
of-which we have any record comes from the days of the Greek
philosophers. Plato, in the Republic, discusses at great length the
conditions under which men might form an ideal government. He
finally comes to the conclusion that until philosophers are kings,
or kings have the wisdom of philosophers, the human race will
have no rest from evils.4 More simply stated, good men will give
us good government.
Aristotle, on the other hand, emphasized the rule of law, rather
than the wisdom of the ruler. The law, he said, is order and consists of the best rules possible. "Moreover," he adds, "he who
would place the supreme power in mind, would place it in God
and the laws; but he who entrusts man with it, gives it to a wild
beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him, for passion
influences those who are in power, even the very best of men; for
which reason law is reason without desire." 5 Aristotle does also
2. For interesting accounts of prehistoric origins, see Gordon Childe,
What Happened in History (1942, Penguin ed., 1946) ; George R. Stewart,
Man (1946). On the specific origins of law, see William Seagle, The Quest
for Law 27.et seq. (1941).
3. William Seagle, The Quest for Law 104, 108-112, 120 (1941);
William Seagle, Men of Law 13 et seq. (1947).
4. The Dialogues of Plato, 1 The Republic, Book 5, p. 737 (Jowett
translation, Random House ed., 1937).
5. A Treatise on Government, or, The Politics of Aristotle, Book 3,
c. 16, p: 101 (Ellis translation, Everyman's Library ed., 1943).
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say that the government which is administered by the best men
is likely to be the best, but from this he concludes that the most
desirable form of government is an aristocracy, rather than a
democracy or an absolute monarchy Running through his discussion is the notion of law as the exercise of human reason uninfluenced by emotion.
The history of man's thinking on this topic since the fourth
century B. C. is largely a story of the struggle between the ideas of
Plato and those of Aristotle. Generally the ideas of Aristotle have
been dominant in the western world, that the law is something
that is somehow above human control. However, the ambiguities
inherent in the Aristotelian argument have left plenty of room for
debate as to the finer points. For many centuries man debated
whether the law was to be found immediately in the word of
God, or whether it should be sought in an order inherent in
"nature," as established by God.
These two ideas were combined by the scholastics of the seventh
century, 6 and St. Thomas Aquinas, the greatest of the scholastics,
wrote elaborate expositions of the law in the thirteenth century
based upon these views. 7 The work of Aquinas was in the form of
complicated deductions from assumed premises. The most important of these assumptions were that law is a standard for
human action, and that its ultimate end is the common happiness.
Derived from these was the definition that law is "An ordinance
of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has the
care of the community "s Law was explained as derived by Reason
from natural law, which is implanted in the minds of men by
God. Thus the conflicting doctrines that law is based on Nature,
on Reason, and on the will of God were reconciled.
Sanctioned by the great authority of Aquinas, these three ideas
formed the foundation of the thinking of the next five centuries.
God-Nature-Reason-were the sources of law Some emphasized one element, some another, but none challenged the fundamental viewpoint, although the conclusions reached from these
assumptions varied widely The idea that God was the source of
law was used to demonstrate conclusively that the king ruled by
6. Isidore of Seville seems to have been the first to identify the Law
of Nature with the Law of God. William Seagle, The Quest for Law 201
(1941)
7 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, and De Regimme Principum.
8. 2 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, c.1,question 90, art. 4,in
F W Coker, Readings inPolitical Philosophy 128 (1914)
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divine right. Obviously this right was in accord with the scheme of
nature and the principles of reason. On the other hand, it was
equally clear that man's first duty was to obey the word of God,
so that if the Prince promulgated a law contrary to the word of
God, a righteous man would be bound to disobey it. Besides, it
was not intended by God that a ruler should oppress his people, so
a limited, rather than an absolute, monarchy was inherent in the
order of nature. It was apparent to still others that God had
originally put man in a state of nature, in which man had avoided
anarchy-an unreasonable and unnatural state-by forming a compact with all the other members of society. This social contract was
thereafter the basis of government, so that law was based on the
general will, which got its inspiration by Reason from God. Thus,
according to this view, the rights of the people were demonstrated
to be superior to those of any monarch, and the divine right of
democracy was established.
The argument was given every variation that human ingenuity
could devise. The philosophical writers--Grotius, Hobbes, Locke,
Montesquie; Rosseau-all started with "natural law" and reached
different conclusions as to what the law was and what it should
be. The legal writers-Bracton, Littleton, Coke, Blackstone--defined their subject in terms of Natural Law and Reason, and then
proceeded to state the rules as they found them in the opinions of
the King's judges. Thomas Paine, the great Anglo-American
spokesman for the common man of the eighteenth century, argued
for the fundamental "Rights of Man" on the ground that each
man had come from the hand of his Maker endowed with these
natural rights. In the writings of Paine and his followers "natural
law" became a revolutionary doctrine which inspired devotion to
democratic government, as a few centuries earlier it had secured
support for the divine right of kings.
The first effective challenge to this general viewpoint was made
in England, about the time of the American Revolution, by
Jeremy Bentham. Justice, Right, Reason, and the Law of Nature,
he said, were "the commonplace retinue of phrases .
which are
but so many ways of intimating that a man is firmly convinced
of the truth of this or that moral proposition, though he either
thinks he needs not, or finds he can't, tell why."O The debates about
law which had been going on, with each man claiming to know the
word of God, to have a true vision of nature, or to possess the
wisdom of Reason, were merely "womanish scolding and childish
9. Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government c. 1,1 38 (1776).
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altercation, which is sure to irritate and which never can persuade."' 0 The only reasonable basis on which such a discussion
can be conducted is that of agreement on some standard which
can be used to-test or measure the results. Bentham found such a
standard in the "principle of utility," which he defined as the nowfamiliar greatest happiness of the greatest number. If we agree
on this principle, he argued, then we may disagree as to the wisdom
of particular rules, but at least there is some basis for settling our
disagreement. It becomes a question of fact as to which result
will produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and
the fact can be determined by observation of past experience combined with reasonable prediction of the future."'
New lines of thought began with this dissent, but the general
development of the law was not immediately disturbed. Blackstone, a contemporary of Bentham's, had defined the law as "A
rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state,
2
commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.""1
The
last great expression of English law before the revolt of the
colonies, this was taken as an authoritative text by all American
lawyers for many years, and by many American lawyers for all
time.
In the nineteenth century, lawyers referred less frequently to
God as the source of law although they continued to assume that
there was a "Law of Nature" which was discovered by the reason
of man lying at the foundation of all the laws of government. But
the ferment of Bentham's ideas was at work. In the last quarter
of the century, two powerful voices began to be heard. Rudolph
von Jhering, a German professor, began writing of law as an
instrument of social control, rather than as an abstract problem
in philosophy 1, His great work, published in 1877, was translated
into English under the expressive title, "Law as a Means to an
End." Jhermg also ridiculed the traditional approach to law in a
delightful satire of "The Heaven of Juristic Concepts." In this
fanciful realm, which was heaven to the theoretical jurists, there
was neither sun nor air, for the concepts of jurisprudence would
have been killed by contact with either There Jhering found the
perfect models of those machines (which so many laymen have
10. Id. c. 4,fr 40.
11. Id. c. 4, f[39.
12. 1 BI. Comm. 44.
13. See Seagle, Rudolph von Jherng: or Law as a Meas to An End,
13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 71 (1945), William Seagle, Men of Law 306 elseq.
(1947).
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long suspected lawyers-of using)-the hairsplitting machine which
was capable of splitting a hair into exactly 999,999 equal parts
(and, in the hands of a skilled operator, of -duplicating the performance on each part), and the dialectic-hydraulic interpretation
press for making ideas conform to juristic interpretations. There
was also an Academy of Legal History, where precedents were not
only discovered but also invented, and a Hall of Concepts which
was entered not through a door, but by butting one's head through
the wall!
In America, in November, 1880, a young Boston lawyer by
the name of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., began a series of popular
lectures with the more prosaic, but equally startling statement:
"The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good
deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed.'

14

At the time, neither outcry nor acclaim greeted Holmes' pronouncement. The legal world regarded his approach with suspicion,
but the body of his work was based on a scholarship so profound
that it was difficult to criticize. Two years after his lectures on
"The Common Law," Holmes was appointed judge of the Massachusetts Supreme Court; twenty years later, Justice of the United
States Supreme Court. In opinions, speeches and articles, Holmes
elaborated his views. The difficulty with most thinking about law,
he pointed out, arises from the confusion of law and morals. Without neglecting the relationship between the two, the distinction
must be kept in mind if one is to have any real idea of what the law
is. For any given individual, he said, the law is simply a prediction
of the way in which the public force possessed by the government
will act upon him. Since the force of government, in our system,
acts upon the individual through the courts, it is clear that the
court decisions of specific cases are law in any practical sense. "The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
15
pretentious, are what I mean by the law."'
This was the keynote for the development of legal thought
during the next half century. John Chipman Gray wrote that we
must distinguish between the law and its sources. The failure to do
14. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881; 1945 ed.).
15. 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Hary. L. Rev. 457 et seq.
(1897), in Collected Legal Papers of Oliver Vendell Holmes 167, 173.
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this, he said, is responsible for the differences between the schools
of jurisprudence.' 8 The law is simply the rules by which the courts
decide cases. On the other hand, the sources of the law-the authorities used by the courts in formulating rules-include statutes,
precedents, customs and principles of morality." In the twentieth
century men were beginning to talk about law without referring
it to the word of God or the Law of Nature.
Yet agreement among the professionals as to the significance
of law was now even more remote than before. A small difference
between Holmes and Gray, which would probably pass unnoticed
by any but the technical eye of a lawyer, was the basis for a new
division of theorists. Holmes found the law in the actual decisions
of the courts, Gray said it was in the rides by which the courts
decide cases. This raises the question, Are the decisions of the
courts and the rules for decision the same thing? In other words,
do the courts actually decide cases on the basis of rules?
One school of law men answer No. The rules, they say, are
merely the rationalizations by which judges seek to justify their
decisions. In every actual case, they point out, there are rules that
can be applied which lead to contrary results. In fact, no case
would ever go to trial unless at least two lawyers reached different
results in applying the rules to the facts in that instance. Therefore,
they conclude, there is no such thing as certainty in the sense of
prediction based on legal rules. The only real law is the decision
of a particular judge in a specific case. The scholars whose writings
have emphasized the particular case, rather than the general rule,
as the basis for a study of the law, have been called Legal Realists,"
although some have objected to the term.'
16. John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law § 191 (1909).
17 Id. §§ 273-274.
18.

On "Legal Realism," see Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 Yale

L. Rev. 234 (1914) (called by Llewellyn "the first rounded presentation of
the realistic attitude") , Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A. B. A. J.
303 (1927) , Moore and Hope, An Institutional Approach to the Law of
Commercial Banking, 38 Yale L. Y. 703 (1929) ; Jerome Frank, Law and
the Modern Mind (1930), Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurtsprudence-The Next
Step, 30 Col. L. Rev. 431 (1930) , Britt, The Rules of Evdence, 25 Corn.
L. Q. 556 (1930), Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 Harv. L. Rev.
1222 (1931), Radin, Legal Realism, 31 Col. L. Rev. 824 (1931), Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Col. L. Rev. 809
(1935), E. S. Robinson, Law and the Lawyers (1935), T. W Arnold, The
Symbols of Government (1935), Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 50
Harv. L. Rev. 557 (1937), 51 Harv. L. Rev. 444, 777 (1938), Llewellyn,
On Reading and Using the New Jurisprudence, 26 A. B. A. J. 300, 418
(1940), My Philosophy of Law (1941), the essays of J. W Bingham, p. 5

et seq., W W Cook, p. 29 et seq., John Dewey, p. 71 et seq., K. N. Llewellyn,
p. 181 et seq., Underhill Moore, p. 201 et seq., Thomas Reed Powell, p. 267
et seq., Max Radin, p. 285 et seq., Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels,
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Opposed to this emphasis on the particular case rather than
the legal principle as the most significant aspect of law, although
agreeing with the Realists that law must adapt itself to social needs,
is a group usually identified as the school of Sociological Jurisprudence. While the lines of separation are not distinct, this school
has developed more from the stimulus of Jhering than of Holmes. -o
The most prominent spokesman of the Sociological School has been
Roscoe Pound, the eminent former Dean of Harvard Law School.",
According to his view, law is "a highly specialized form of social
control in a developed politically organized society." 2 The purpose of law is to satisfy as much of the total of human wants as we
may with the least sacrifice. Consistent with this purpose, legal
history is a record of continually wider recognition and satisfaction of human desires. 3 Pound emphasizes that law properly includes three elements: a group of professional administrators, a
traditional technique, and a body of rules, principles and standards
by which conduct is measured and cases are decided.2 ' Pound has
been acclaimed as the most fruitful of legal philosophers,2 and
damned as a prophet whose writings are a mass of inconsistendes. 2 6 In general, he represents a middle ground between the
tough-minded Realists on the one side, and the traditionalists on
App. 5 (1942); Law and Learning Theory-Moore and Callahan, 53 Yale
L. J. 1 (1943), Hull, 53 Yale L. J. 330 (1944), Yntema, 53 Yale L. J. 338
(1944) ; Interpretations of Modem Legal Philosophies (1947), the essays

of: Thomas A. Cowan, Legal Pragmatism and Beyond, p. 130, Karl Olivecrona, Law As Fact, p. 542, Max Rhemstein, Who Watches the Watchman?
p. 589, Julius Stone, Fallacies of the Logical Form in English Law, p. 696;
Simpson and Field, Social EngineeringThrough Law" The Need for a School
of Applied .urisprudence, 22 N. Y. U. L. Q. 145 (1947), Cowan, The Relation
of Law to Expernmental Social Science, 96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 484 (1948).
Perhaps the last two articles are closer to the approach suggested in the
present article than to the jurisprudence of realism. In any event, there is considerable diversity among the references cited above, and the list is intended
to be suggestive rather than definitive. Also see references cited in note 45
infra.
19. Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels App. 5, p. 276 et seq. (1942).
20. Seagle, Rudolph von, Jhering: or Law as a Means to An End, 13
Chi. L. Rev. 71 (1945).
21. See Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,
24 Harv. L. Rev. 591 (1911), 25 Harv. L. Rev. 140 (1912), Pound, Theories
of Law, 22 Yale L. J. 114 (1912), Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 50
Harv. L. Rev. 557 (1937), 51 Harv. L. Rev. 444, 777 (1938) ; Interpretations
of Modem Legal Philosophies: Albert Kocourek, Roscoe Pound as a
Former Colleague Knew Him, p. 419, Edwin W. Patterson, Pound's Theory
of Social Interests, p. 558 (1947) ; and references in following notes.
22. Pound, in My Philosophy of Law 249 et seq. (1941).
23. Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 99 (1922).
24. Pound, in My Philosophy of Law 249 et seq. (1941).
25. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 81 (1924).
26. Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels App. 7, p. 332 ci seq. (1942).
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the other, although in later years he has tended more and more to
express the xiews of the most conservative part of the bar.
The Supreme Court has wrestled long and painfully with this
problem. The issue first came before the Court in 1842, in the
celebrated case of Swift v. Tyson.27 The case began when Swift,
a resident of Maine, sued Tyson, a New Yorker, in the federal
court of New York on a bill of exchange. Tyson offered facts in
defense which would have been a good defense under the decisions of the New York courts, but which would not have been
a defense to the action in many other states. The federal courts
were bound by statute to follow the "laws" of the state in which
they were sitting. So the issue arose whether the federal courts
should consider the decisions of the State courts as "law." The
Supreme Court unanimously answered "NO"' Speaking for the
court, Justice Story said, "In the ordinary use of language it will
hardly be contended that the decisions of courts constitute laws.
They are, at the most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are
not of themselves laws. They are often re-examined, reversed, and
qualified by the courts themselves, whenever they are found to be
either defective, or ill-founded or otherwise incorrect." Justice
Story did concede that the decisions of local courts "are entitled
to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of
this court, but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive
authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up and
governed." The law is to be found in something far more permanent and perfect than the mere opinions of mortal judges, it
can be found in "the general principles and doctrines of
jurisprudence." In a later case, the Court indicated that jurisprudence
is based on the Law of Nature, which "is founded on the common
consent as well as the common sense of the world.""8
This official adoption of the doctrine of Natural Law went
unchallenged for many years. Not until the tough-minded Holmes
reached the bench was it even seriously questioned. Then, in 1917,
Holmes criticized an opinion of the Court in a short sentence that
laid bare the whole fuzzy conception underlying the majority assumption. "The common law," Holmes declared, "is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified. ' 29 It was a lone
dissent.
27 41 U. S. 1 (1842).
28. The Prize Cases, 67 U. S. 635, 670 (1862)
29. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 218, 222 (1917)
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Ten years later Holmes was still dissenting from the same
proposition. It is hard to resist the impression, he wrote, that
there- is a transcendental body of law outside of any particular
state, one august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only
task'of any court. "But there is no such body of law. The fallacy
and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there is
this outside thing to be found. Law is a word used with different
meanings, but law in the sense in which courts speak of it today
-does not exist without some definite authority behind it."so It was
still a dissent, but Holmes was no longer alone, Brandeis and
Stone had joined him.
Holmes left the bench, but his ideas remained. In 1938 the
Supreme Court again considered the old question of the nature of
the law which federal courts were supposed to apply. By this time,
Holmes' logic had become irresistible. The opinion of the majority
argued that the former position of the Court had been erroneous
and contrary to the Constitution, on technical grounds. But the
decision itself was clear-cut the old doctrine of a transcendental
body of law existing as a brooding omnipresence in the sky was
repudiated. 31 Having freed itself from the limiting conception of
a transcendental Natural Law, the Court has continued to expand
its definition as new cases come before it. The new definition of
law is a flexible one: "It would be a narrow interpretation of jurisprudence to confine the notion of 'laws' to what is found written
on the statute books, and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon it....Deeply imbedded traditional ways of carrying
out state policy ...are often tougher and truer law than the dead
words of the written text. '3' So the Court has held that the decisions of the lower State courts are law,is that the practices of
State commissions and county assessors
are law,3 ' and that federal
35
law.
are
regulations
administrative
In spite of the authority of the Supreme Court, the majority
of the judges and lawyers seem to remain either unconvinced or
unaware that there has been any kind of change in thinking about
the law since the days of Blackstone. Courts continue to justify
30. Black & White Taxicab & T. Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxcab & T.

Co., 276 U. S. 518, 532, 533 (1928).
31. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkms,304 U. S. 64 (1938).
32. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browmng, 310 U. S. 362, 369 (1940).
33. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169 (1940), rehearing
denied, 311 U. S.730 (1946).
34. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S.362 (1940).
35. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S.407

(1942).
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their decisions by an appeal to "natural justice" and similar fuzzy
verbalisms. 3 6 Lawyers think and argue in traditional terms. Legal
periodicals are mainly filled with articles that seem to have been
written with quill pens by the flickering light of tallow candles.
And faint confused echoes of Aquinas continue to reverberate
through the hollow halls of the citadels of legal conservatism. 7
The viewpoint of the traditionalists is epitomized by one of the
eminent members of the bar in his conclusion that the rules of law
constitute a system which is fair and reasonable, and if the standards
of law are not adapted to human affairs, then it is the human
race which is at fault and not the law 138
Today there seem to be more views of law than ever before,
and even less agreement. The prevailing views are roughly represented by the Realist, the Sociological, and the Transcendental
schools, but such a classification glosses over most of the points
on which there is a current spilling of much ink, if little blood.
Within each school there are doctrinal points of difference on
which no two scholars will agree. Pound finds twelve distinct
conceptions of law within the traditional schools alone 9 (although
it takes a philosophical microscope to see the difference between
some of his categories) Disagreement arises from the different approaches to legal problems. Cardozo suggests four, the philosophical, the historical, the traditional, and the sociological.4' More recent thought has suggested others.41 Contention arises from the
varying purposes to which the analyses are devoted. Dean Wigmore
finds that there are at least nine such viewpoints in current discussions. 42 There are disputes as to the origin of the law-whether
divine revelation, reason, custom, social contract, force or fraud.
Debate rages as to the proper ends of the law-to keep the peace,
to maintain the status quo, to assure the freedom of individual
action, to satisfy human wants, or to satisfy the desires of a
dominant group or class. Dispute exists on every level, from the
36. E.g., Ralli v. Societa Anomma, 222 Fed. 994, 1000 (D.D.C. 1915),
George's Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F 2d 219, 222 (App. D.C. 1942)
37 E.g., Ben W Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler, 31 A. B. A. J.

569 (1945), Simmons, The Supremacy of Law, 32 A. B. A. J. 17 (1946),
Holman, Forms of Government, 32 A. B. A. J. 190 (1946), What Price
Pragmatismt 34 A. B. A. J. 1120 (1948), Natural Moral Law, 35 A. B. A. J.
42 (1949), The Court and the Popular Will, 35 A. B. A. J. 129 (1949),
and almost any other issue of the same publication.
38. John M. Zane, The Story of Law 459 (1927)

39. Roscoe Pound, op. cit. supra note 23, at 60 et seq.
40.

Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921),

The Growth of the Law 62 (1924)

41. See reference cited in note 18, supra.
42. Wigmore in My Philosophy of Law 313 et seq. (1941)
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most basic assumptions to the most specific applications. The outstanding fact is that the area of disagreement is as wide as the
field of law itself.
In revieving the whole debate, which has lasted for more than
two thousand years already, it is apparent that remarkably little
information has been conveyed by the millions of tracts, essays
and volumes which have been cast upon the waters by earnest
thinkers. Ideas have floundered and drowned in the sea of words
called jurisprudence, and the flotsam has been mostly froth. Some
service has, indeed, been rendered by the modem thinkers,
Bentham, Jhering, Holmes, Pound, the Realists, and others of
similar views, in bringing law out of the sky and down to earth.
In tearing away the veil of pretentious verbiage that had been cast
around the notions of Natural Law, the modem thinkers have exposed that concept as a superstitious belief in Supernatural Law,
beguilingly presented as though it were somehow identified with
the "nature" that man associates with the good earth. Their combined effect has been to change law from a supernatural superstition to a human institution. The subject which could formerly be
known only by mystical intuition may now, at least, be studied by
mundane minds.
Still, the fact remains that we are no nearer agreement on
answers to the fundamental questions of law than we were two
thousand years ago. It seems about time for some one to begin to
suspect that we are either asking the wrong questions, or looking
for answers in the wrong way, or doing both. Once this ugly
suspicion takes root, it will probably not take long for the conviction to become established that jurisprudence has been a sterile
study because its questions have been meaningless and its methods
have been futile.
To consider first the ubiquitous question as to the "nature" of
law, what possible significance can such an inquiry have, except
to provide a convenient definition for those who wish to use that,
rather than some other, term? A policeman will get no less respect
because his action in arresting a citizen is not classed as "law" by
some scholar. A client who has been demed a license by some
commission will not be comforted to hear his lawyer assure him
that administrative action is not "law." In fact, were it possible
to get universal agreement that law is any one of the things which
it has been claimed to be, the only result would be to make us
invent some other term for the residue of governmental actions.
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Obviously law is an abstraction. And abstractions are inventions of the human mind, not phenomena of nature. Therefore the
definition (that is, construction) of an abstraction is a matter of
convenience and usage. Whatever the definition, it is an arbitrary
one, as it exists only by virtue of general agreement, and cannot
be "proved" or "disproved," since it cannot rationally be called
either "right" or "wrong." The function of a definition is simply
to furnish a means of communication by pointing out a particular
category that is to be represented by a single term. Anyone who
objects to the definition of a particular term may (both legally and
logically) set up his own definition, and, if he can get anyone
else to agree with him, carry on discourse with his own terms
and definitions.
But the fact that one is able to use one term to mean two different things is no more significant than the fact that you can use
two terms to mean the same thing. It is sublimely ridiculous for
people speaking different languages to argue as to which word is
the "true" name for a man, or a house-or the law It is equally
ridiculous to argue as to which definition is the "true" meaning
of a single term in any language. Consequently the question as
to the nature of law will never be Answered, since there is no
answer-the question is a meaningless one. The nature of law is
whatever we define the term to mean, and we may define it as
43
suits our pleasure and convenience.
The problem remains, of course, as to how law can most conveniently be defined for purposes of intelligent discourse. Those
whose orientation remains primarily theological will claim that
only some form of divine revelation deserves to be called "law,"
and that all the rest is something else, say, mere "politics." Others
who are somewhat less mystical will prefer to use the term to
indicate some level of government activity-legislative, executive,
administrative or judicial. While the definition will, in any event,
be an arbirtary one, the most sensible procedure would appear to
43. For further popular discussion of the relationship between abstraction, definition and meaning, see Stuart Chase, The Tyranny of Words
(1938), S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Action (1939) , Lee Loevinger, The
Law of Free Enterprise 3 et seq., 88 et seq. (1949) For more technical
consideration of the subject, see P W Bridgman, The Logic of Modern
Physics 5 et seq. (1927), Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method 223 et seq. (1934), Cohen, supra
note 18, John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry 349 et seq. (1938),
Felix Kaufmann, Methodology of the Social Sciences 33 et seq. (1944).

Charles Morris, Signs, Language and Behavior (1946), and references cited
in the exhaustive bibliography to this latter volume.
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be to seek what Bertrand Russell calls an "ostensive definition."'"
This means simply observing how people actually use the word,
watching what they point to when they use the term "law."
If we seek the law that men live by, rather than the law
philosophers dream of, the definition may be less pleasing to the
prejudices of some and to the esthetic ideas of others, but at least
lawyers will have the tremendous advantage of beginning to talk
in terms that the public can understand. Such a definition, most
assuredly, will be less abstract than any of those proposed by the
great thinkers of the law. Probably it will start with the cop on
the corner, and include the local tax assessor, the desk sergeant,
the municipal judge, and the clerk of court. Certainly the law that
men live by is not a transcendental abstraction hovering somewhere
between.heaven and earth, nor a vague body of precepts and principles which are concerned with other abstractions called "interests." It can not even be confined to the decisions, or predictions
of decisions, of particular cases. The great majority of men certainly act according to what they believe the law to be without
any thought of being called to answer in court for their actions.
Men obey traffic lights and parking signs because the law
says they should. They pay taxes according to the assessments of
commissioners and boards. They go to jail because juries convict
and judges sentence; but they go into the Army because the
President orders them to report for induction. (Remember?) The
introduction of a bill in Congress causes the stock market to
fluctuate; and vast changes in business or labor practice may occur
from the mere passage of a statute. Trains, planes and broadcasting stations operate according to the orders of administrative
commissions, sometimes backed by judicial authority, often not.
Lawyers may debate the fine distinctions between judicial, administrative and legislative action. For the man in the street,
action which involves government authority is law. The words and
actions of government agents, acting in their official capacity, are
the laws men live by.
In practice, the lawyers themselves are coming to act upon
this definition, whatever else they may say. They are no longer
able to confine their attention to judicial statements of traditional
principles. Today they must be familiar with statutes, executive
orders, and administrative rules, as well as with many practices
not to be found in books at all. When their financial interest is con44. Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits 63
et seq. (1948).
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cerned, the bar associations have no hesitation in claiming that
accountants who prepare tax returns, traffic experts who appear
before the I. C. C., and other similar specialists, are "practicing
law," although in seminars and journals they dearly love to derogate such activities as being quite outside the sacred field of law
However, we must be on guard against the temptation to feel
that the acceptance of this-or any other-definition has solved
any problems. It has not. It has only given us one term for our
discourse, and perhaps marked a field of study It is at precisely
this point that the great failure of jurisprudence has occurred.
Jurisprudence has never concerned itself with any problems beyond setting up definitions, concepts and principles which are selfconsistent and inclusive. It has been purely philosophic not only in
its subject matter but also in its methods. It has attempted to establish a systematic arrangement of legal concepts and principles,
and it has attempted to do this exclusively by introspective cogitation.
Because jurisprudence has set the pattern for legal thinking,
and because jurisprudence has been concerned with trying to
answer meaningless questions by futile speculation, the law has
proceeded very largely on a priorz grounds and has adapted itself
to social needs only under great pressure and very slowly The
lawyers have, in fact, so bemused themselves with words and
theories that they have not even yet developed anything like a
rational system for performing their principal function of deciding particular controversies. Most decisions are presented behind
a verbal facade that is cast in the syllogistic form. But it requires
little sophistication to demonstrate that the logical form has little
to do with judicial decisions.4 5 One recent writer classifies legal
principles according to the logical fallacies involved in them.4 0
First, there are the principles of "meaningless reference," those
that simply do not make sense logically Typical of these is the
45. This has been observed frequently since Justice Holmes' classical
statement on the subject, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law
1 (1881). See references cited in note 18 slipra, especially Cohen, supra note
18, Jerome Frank, Law and the Modem Mind (1930). Also see Hutcheson,
The Judgment Intuitive" The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions,
14 Corn. L. Q. 274 (1929), Hutcheson, Lawyer's Law and the Little, Small
Dice, 7 Tulane L. Rev. 1 (1932), Frank, What Conrts Do in Fact, 26 I1.
L. Rev. 658 (1931), C. J. Keyser, Mathematics As a Culture Clue, essay on
The Meaning of Mathematics I et seq. (1947) , Jerome Frank, Say It with

Music, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 921 (1948) , and reference cited in following note.

But compare Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
501 (1948).

46. Julius Stone, Fallacies of the Logical Form in English Law, in

Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies 696 (1947)
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legal distinction between "provisions" and "exceptions" in statutory rules. Second, are the legal categories of "concealed multiple
reference." These are legal concepts which appear- to be single in
their statement, but which actually apply to numerous diverse situations that have little in common. Examples are the doctrine of
res gestae, and concepts such as "right," "malice," and "property."
Third, are legal principles of "competing reference," which are
pairs or groups of rules that overlap in their application to any
particular situation, although they lead to different results. Among
this group are the distinction between substantive and procedural
rules and the competing doctrines of trusts and contracts as applied
to third-party beneficiary situations. Fourth, are legal principles
of "concealed circuitous reference," in which the definition of the
principle depends upon assuming the very concept that is being
defined. There are numerous examples of this in the law, two
outstanding ones being in the definition of negligence, particularly
with respect to duty and the remoteness of damage, and in contracts, the inference by a court of implied conditions and of quasicontracts.4 7 Fifth, is the category of "indeterminate reference,"
which includes that vast multitude of legal terms that are so .rague
that they can be construed to mean anything-or nothing. Notable
among this legion are the notions of just cause, due care, fair,
reasonable, arbitrary, and clean hands. Many, if not most, conventional legal principles fall into more than one of these categories.
Anyone who has the least lingering faith that lawsuits are
decided on a "logicaT' basis should consider the matter in the light
of the recent achievements in cybernetics .' Machines are now in
existence which have so far imitated "thought processes" that they
can solve differential equations and other "logical" operations of
equal or greater complexity. The machines can be constructed
to solve equations with virtually any number of variables, and
with large numbers of variables the operation is much faster than
when performed by the human mind. Why should not a machine
be constructed to decide lawsuits? The complexity of the problems presented, measured by the number of variables involved, is
well within the limits of existing machines. The difficulty is that
we have no terms to put into the machines, as the scientists have
numbers and symbols. Legal terms are almost all vague verbalizations which have only a ritualistic significance. As soon as the
47 For further examples and discussion of the circuitous reference of
legal terms, see Lee Loevinger, The Law of Free Enterprise 88 et seq. (1949).

48. See Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in
the Animal and the Machine (1948).
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judge has decided which term to use-negligence, due care, contract, property, right or duty-the decision of the case has been
made. The use of terms is like the old custom of donning a black
cap to pronounce the death sentence. The costume is chosen only
after the decision has been reached. The terms which apply to the
case are selected only after the result has been decided. But the
choice of legal terms to describe an act is certainly not a "logical"
operation. Where it is not purely arbitrary, it is, at most, intuitive.
Thus, by present methods, the determination of every genuine
legal issue is made at the sub-verbal (and usually subconscious)
level, where formal "logic" can neither exist nor exert influence.
Recognition of the fact that lawsuits are not decided by logic
is not new Bentham suggested as much, and Holmes said it. More
recently, Frank, Arnold and others have elaborated the point.""
But here the modern movement has bogged down. Frank insists
that uncertainty is inherent in the legal process, and that the grasping for certainty in general principles is simply an expression of
infantile emotional attitudes which have persisted into adulthood. 0
Arnold finds the explanation of the inconsistencies and absurdities
of the law in the fact that all our social institutions are mere
symbols of our dreams and aspirations.5" But all this is merely a
continuation of the ancient quest for the philosopher's stone. The
new school seeks it in some scientific, rather than some moral, explanation or principle, but the fallacy is the same. This is simply
a new jurisprudence with a new vocabulary The argument seeks
to substitute a modem analysis for an ancient one, but the traditional techniques are still in use. It is all armchair speculation.
If mankind is capable of learning anything, it should have
learned by this time that it can solve no problems by introspection,
but only by investigation. Knowledge cannot be acquired by speculation, but only by observation. It should be apparent by now that
philosophical speculation is no more going to solve any of the
problems of law than it has solved the problems of any other phase
of man's earthly existence. In every other field of activity, knowledge has remained primitive until the adoption of scientific methods
-then science has increased man's knowledge and power faster
and further than the boldest pre-scientific philosopher ever dreamed
of. One after the other, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology,
49. See references cited in note 45 supra. Also see Jerome Frank, A
Sketch of An Influence in Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies
189 (1947)
50. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930)
51. T. W Arnold, The Symbols of Government (1935).
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medicine, and finally psychology have abandoned speculation in
favor-of investgation. Economics is now beginning to move in the
same -direction- The only important -area of human activity which
has developed no significant new methods in the last twenty centuries is law.
John Dewey has commented cogently on this situation. "In
all the fields but the social," he writes, "the notion that the correct
solution is already given and that it only remains to find the facts
that prove it so is so thoroughly discredited that those who act
upon it are regarded as pretenders, or as cranks who are trying
to impose some pet notion upon the facts. But in social matters,
those who claim that they are m possession of the one sure solution of social problems often set themselves up as being peculiarly
scientific while others are floundering around in an 'empirical'
morass."5 2 Whereas in other fields rational procedure is regarded

as collecting facts first and then attempting to formulate theories,
in the field of social problems facts are usually collected only for
the support of some preconceived theory, such as individualism,
collectivism, socialism, communism, capitalism, or something else.
Thus the very character of the observation, as well as the facts
observed, are determined by the theory held. As a result there is a
continuing battle as to the "correct" theories of social action, but
no real consideration at all given to the method of securing facts and
arriving at conclusions. The adoption of a scientific attitude with
respect to social problems leads Dewey to conclude that most of
the current controversies in this field are completely meaningless.
Present theories are no more than the battle-cries of partisans
seeking power. If we would increase our knowledge and have some
chance of arriving at an intelligent solution to our problems, it is
essential that we adopt scientific methods of inquiry.
Of course, the suggestion that science be introduced into law
and other social fields is a threat to all those with a vested interest
in a viewpoint, and so it is met with indignant objection. The first
to be raised usually is the argument that government is the one
field in which "experiment" is impossible because the interests
involved are so important that we cannot afford to "take a chance"
on the results of an experiment. This argument rests upon the
assumption that- if we are willing to forego the advantages of experiment in --everyday life, we can simply rely upon methods and
institutions which have been proved by experience. Actually this
assumption-is a naive and dangerous illusion. In a changing world
52. John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry 497 (1938).
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there is no way to avoid experiment (in the sense of risk, or undertakings of which the result is unknown). To avoid experimenting,
it is necessary to perform a similar act more than once under substantially identical circumstances, so that the result can be predicted in advance. But it is only in the laboratory that conditions
can be controlled accurately enough so that we can know they are
substantially identical on successive occasions. In social situations,
changing conditions are constantly forcing experiments upon us.
In other words, changing conditions in the world are constantly imposing upon us the risk of unknown and unwelcome consequences from our actions. There is no possible way to avoid this
risk. The one choice we do have is to seek all possible knowledge
about the problem involved and to attempt to use this knowledge
first in solving the problem, and, if we fail, in learming the causes
of the failure. For example, to apply the principles devised for the
regulation of horse and buggy and steamboat to automobiles and
airplanes is as much of an experiment as it would be to write
wholly new laws, drafted to meet the conditions created by new
machines. The only difference is in the kind of experiment. In
refusing to change established principles and institutions to meet
new conditions, we are "experimenting" thoughtlessly and blindly
In attempting to devise new laws and new techniques to meet new
conditions, we are using what knowledge and ability we have.
The reliance on tradition to solve new problems is a gamble in
which the cost and result is literally left to chance, the conscious
effort to devise new solutions for new problems is an experiment
in which the risk is calculated and the attempt made to reach a
desired result. Without the use of science, the assumption of the
inevitable risks of living is merely a gamble, through science we
can at least raise our risks to the dignity of experiments.5"
The same argument, cast in different language, is sometimes
directed to the difficulty of the "trial and error" method in social
affairs. Yet it should be plain to all but the hopelessly naive that
we have no choice of accepting or rejecting the so-called trial
and error method in solving social problems. The only thing we
can do is to keep on trying, and it is as certain as anything can
be that we shall keep on erring very frequently Actually, trial
and error is no "method" at all. The only rational method is trial
53. As examples of the argument that experiment is impossible in the
field of law, see My Philosophy of Law, Lon L. Fuller, p. 118 et seq., Walter
B. Kennedy, p. 155 et seq. (1941) As an example of an actual experiment
in this field, see Printzlem. Deferred Prosecution Provisonal Release of
Juvenile Delinquents. 7 Fed. B. J. 278 (1946).
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and error and clange. Mere repetition of trial and error accomplishes nothing; only successively different trials will ever eliminate
the error and achieve success. The one choice we do have is between studying past errors as a guide to future trials, and blundering blindly ahead in an unreasoning faith that somehow if we
simply try often enough we may, by chance, avoid error.
Paradoxically enough, those who argue at one time that it is
quite impossible to adapt the methods of science to the problems
of law, are found at other times hinting that we have already tried
scientific methods in recent years and found them wanting. Although the argument is not usually put quite so bluntly, it is
suggested in the attacks on the "materialistic philosophy" of the
present.54 Further weight is loaned the suggestion by the freedom
with which modem legal theorists employ the word "science."
The present fashion seems to be to use the word "science" in
place of "philosophy," so that contemporary jurisprudence has become, by self-appointment, "legal science."5 5 In both cases it must
be said that there is a complete failure to understand the nature
of scientific method-or, for that matter, of philosophy. Science
is not simply another kind of philosophy. Quite the contrary, as

Max Eastman has pointed out, "Science in its mature form casts
loose from philosophy, just as earlier it cast loose from religion
and magic. It contents itself on the theoretic side with specific
solutions of specific problems, and on the practical side with
methods of procedure for accomplishing specific things." 50 There

may be a philosophy based upon science, but it can never be a part
of science itself. Philosophy is an attempt to generalize on the

basis of speculation; science is an attempt to specify on the basis of
investigation. There has not yet been any such thing as a "scien-

tific" legal theory. The basic philosophy and methodology of the
law today is the same as in the days of Hammurabi, Justinian and

Aquinas.
Indeed the law has been remarkably successful in insulating
itself against any infiltration of scientific knowledge. A rare, unlucky criminal is identified by ballistics, fingerprints or blood54. See Palmer, Background for Dissensions: Praginatim and Its

Effect on the Law, 34 A. B. A. J. 1092 (1948) ; and references cited m note
37 supra.

55. E.g., Gray, op. cit. supra note 16, §§ 150,314; Roscoe Pound, An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, Preface (1922), Interpretations of
Modem Legal Philosophies, especially A. S. de Bustamante y Montoro,
Kelsenism, p. 43, and E. M. Paz, Lask and Doctrine of the Science of Law
(1947); and discussion. and references cited in Cowan, The Relation of
Law to Experimental Social Science, 96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 484 (1948).
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stains. An occasional psychiatrist is consulted on the issue of insanity A few (very few) psychologists are called in to help treat
juvenile delinquents. And legislatures sometimes consult an expert on sewage or smoke abatement. Perhaps this list is not complete, but it fairly represents the extent to which science has so
far influenced the law With some twenty-five thousand cases a
year coming from the appellate courts alone, no reported decision
has yet been determined by anything approaching a truly scientific investigation. 7 The law has not yet established institutional
techniques for getting scientific knowledge about its problems.
Most certainly it has not yet made anything like a trial of scientific method.
The most appealing of the arguments against the trial of
scientific methods in social fields is the ego-inflating assertion that
while planets, plants, elements and atoms can all be studied objectively man himself is so uniquely distinguished from all the rest
of the cosmos that he is forever beyond the range of science.
Variants of this argument are that we can investigate inanimate,
but not living things, scientifically, and that we cannot investigate
society as we do other things because we are a part of it ourselves. Gratifying as these arguments are to our vanity, it is
clear that they are based on sentiment rather than logic. Science
has long since crossed the borderline between inanimate and
living objects of investigation, and our studies in biology, botany,
and even physiology are as rigorously scientific as those in the
physical fields. Further, the more the investigations advance the
greater appears the similarity and the relationship between animate and inanimate phenomena. Even the most unique of human
achievements-thinking itself-can, on an elementary level, be
performed by "inanimate" machines.58
The claim that man cannot investigate himself is belied every
day A hundred years of progress in treating human physical
ailments bears eloquent testimony to the value of man's study
of man.5 9 More recently turned to the employment of scientific
techniques, economics, and specifically econometrics, is beginning
56. Max Eastman, Introduction to Modern Library edition of Capital
and Other Writings by Karl Marx (1932). Also see, Sir James Jeans,
Physics and Philosophy 82 et seq. (1943)

57 The suggestion of a scientific approach may be seen in the dissenting opinion of Judge Edgerton in George's Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 126

F 2d 219 (App. D.C. 1942).
58. Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics (1948), N. Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1949,
p. 27, "Artificial Brain Depicted by Doctor."
59. See H. W Haggard, Devils, Drugs and Doctors (1929, Pocket
Book ed. 1946).
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to point the way toward greater control over parts of the social
environment than conservative theorists have previously been willing to admit as possible.6" Numerous other aspects of human behavior, both individual and group, are being studied by psychologists and anthropologists with great success. 61 The achievements
of psychology in contributing to industrial and military efficiency
are too well known to require more than a reference. Whatever
else they may prove, and whether any particular conclusion stands
or not, these studies demonstrate that man and his behavior are
as much a subject for scientific investigation as any other natural
phenomenon.
The most frequent and most ingenuous of the arguments
against the use of science in the field of law (or any other field,
for that matter) is the claim that it "disregards human values."
The assumption of tis argument, usually implicit though sometimes stated, is that science is a sort of Frankensteinian monster
which, once created, irrestibly drags its creators to a predetermined
arid unpredictable fate. Such a belief can rest only on a complete
failure to understand the nature of science. It is simply a tool,
a technique for getting knowledge-nothing more.62 Certainly a
man who has some knowledge of probable consequences is just
as free to control his own conduct as one who does not, unless
ignorance itself is considered to be freedom. Science no more controls the use to which it will be put than an automobile controls
the destination to which it will be driven. Clearly possession of an
automobile gives us greater range of freedom of movement, for
we can travel faster and further than on foot or by horse. Just so,
the use of science will increase our freedom of action, for it will
give-us more efficient ways of doing whatever we want to doas it has already done in so many fields.
60. See J. M. Clark, Preface to Social Economics, especially c. 13.
and appendix (1936), S. E. Harris, editor, The New Economics (1947);
George Soule, Introduction to Economic Science (1948).
61. See Stuart Chase, The Proper Study of Mankind (1948), George
A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? (1947), E. G. Boring, A History of
Experimental Psychology (1929), Murphy and Newcomb, Experimental
Social Psychology (1937); Gardner Murphy, Personality A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure (1948), C. Kluckhohn, A Mirror for Man,
Anthropology and Modem Man (1949), Melville J. Herskovitz, Man and
His Works: The Science of Cultural Anthropology (1948), Ruth Benedict,
Patterns of Culture (1934, Penguin ed. 1946). These references are merely
suggestive of a vast and growing field which it would be futile to attempt
to exhaust at this point.
62. I am aware of the ultimate uncertainty of all human knowledge,
which scientific knowledge shares. See Russell, op. cit. supra note 44. However, as compared to the speculative conjectures of jurisprudence, scientific
knowledge may be regarded as a rock of solid certainty.
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The discussion of science and values in this field sometimes
gets confused with the argument about law and morals. It is a
favorite trick of the traditionalists to identify law and morals
by means of definition, as Blackstone did. This involves the
uncritical assumption that law and morals are the same, or substantially the same thing. As a practical consequence, it puts
the law beyond criticism or improvement, since any attack on the
law is, by definition, immoral. By a parity of reasoning, if law
and morals are identical, it is lese-majesty, or worse, to suggest
that the operation of the law should be examined in an objective
manner. However, a little close thinking will show that the insistence on separating law and morals is not an attack on moral
values, but rather an elevation of them to a more important place
in the hierarchy of thought. So long as law and morals are the
same, all laws are moral, and morality can be no more than the
law But once we are free to possess moral values that are independent of the positive law, then we have a scale of values
that is even higher than the law and a standard by which the law
may be judged. Then, too, we become free to look at the law
as it actually is and as it actually works, and, since we may have a
moral standard by which to judge the operation, morals then become of real importance in shaping the law
There is one fact of fundamental significance which somehow
seems to get lost in the usual philosophizing on this subject. The
basic premise of all law is the assumption that every law will
somehow produce certain results in individual or group conduct.
No modem society has ever attempted to legislate for the denizens
of an upper or nether region beyond the earth. Law is always
meant to affect the conduct of the people of this earth. Whether it
does this or not, and in what manner, is certainly a matter that
can be investigated. The importance of such an investigation is, of
course, precisely equal to the importance of the law itself.
Whether law be human or supernatural in origin, its ultimate
significance for mankind is its relation to and effect upon human
behavior. The great lesson of western civilization is that such
a relation, between natural phenomena, cannot be adequately understood on the basis of introspection, speculation or superstition,
but requires investigation. The methods and techniques of investigation are what we mean by science. Thus the importance of
applying science to law is exactly commensurate with the significance of law
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It is, of course, perfectly true that there are not yet adequate
tchniques in existence for investigating many of the most important problems in the field of social control of behavior. This
appears to be the most forceful argument against the use of science
in this area. In fact, the argument, for all its force, is no real
objection. To begin with, there are already in existence many
po.werful and promising techniques for such studies. To mention only examples, the methods of semantics and statistics are
already well established disciplines, while psychology, anthropology, sociology and econometrics, are rapidly developing more
specialized techniques.6 3 Some promising studies have already been
made with these techniques in the field of criminal behavior."
But even wholly disregarding the substantial body of knowledge that is already available for this undertaking, the argument
that- we do not now have the methods of study or the body of
knowledge necessary to discover answers to all legal problems is
simply a statement of present ignorance. The rational reaction to
a recognized state of ignorance would appear to be an acknowledgement of the need for study, rather than a determination not to
learn. Psychoanalysis suggests some interesting animadversions
upon such a reluctance to learn, but they are unnecessary, and perhaps irrelevant, to this discussion.
A more pointed answer to the argument-from-present-ignorance
is that it is part of the province of science itself to formulate
problems and institute methods. Science begins by asking meaningful, answerable questions in place of the vague, and unanswerable
psuedo-problems of pre-scientific speculative philosophy. Later,
after some genuine research has been done, the problems are
determined largely by the results and data of prior inquiry.
63. See references cited in notes 60, 61 supra. Also see Karl Pearson,
The Grammar of Science (1892, Everyman's Library ed. 1943). This great
classic is still probably as fine a statement of the fundamentals of the scientific
method, and their ever-wvidening field of application, as has been made. Also
see Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to NonAristotelian Systems and General Semantics; Stuart Chase, The Tyranny

of Words (1928); S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Action (1941), Charles
Morns, Signs, Language and Behavior (1946). For an interesting example
of the application of scientific and statistical techniques to a complicated
social problem, see Kiapper and Glock, Trial by Newspaper, Scientific
American, Feb., 1949, p. 16.
64. See J. Michael and N. J. Adler, Crime, Law and Social Science
(1933) ;. F. F Laune, Predicting Criminality (1936) ; W Healy and A. F
Bronner, New Light- on Delinquency and Its Treatment (1936); Sheldon
and Eleanor Glueck, Criminal Careers in Retrospect (1943); David Abrahamson, Crime and the Human Mind (1944), P H. Winfield, Mental
Abnormality and Crime (1944); Han von Hentig, The Criminal and His
Victim (1948).
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This has been the course of development of all the physical and
natural sciences, and there is no reason to assume that it will
be otherwise in the social sciences.0 5
Likewise the argument that we cannot yet use scientific methods
in the social fields because of the present diversity of views as to
problems, methods, principles, and even terminology, is in fact
one of the strongest arguments in favor of such use. The hallmark
of science is the social character of its results. It is, from one
viewpoint, simply a method of securing answers that will be
acceptable to all competent observers.60 A determination by a single
scientist remains merely an hypothesis. Only after a proposition
has been generally accepted by those engaged in similar investigation does it attain the dignity of a scientific theory or fact. It
is, of course, always more difficult to attain such agreement in the
early stages of a study, while the difficulties diminish as data accumulate, so the increase of scientific knowledge proceeds at an
exponential rate. It is certainly difficult to arrive at generally acceptable results in the fields of social study at the present time.
Whether this difficulty is due simply to the fact that scientific
techniques have not yet been utilized, or whether it will remain
more difficult to arrive at scientifically valid results in law than
in, say, photo-chemistry or biophysics, is wholly a matter of conjecture at the present time. In any event, the greater difficulty in
law, if there is one, does not indicate any lesser need for rigorous
scientific investigation of the problems. On the contrary, the
divergence of present opinions in this field points tip the necessity
for the introduction of scientific-that is, demonstrable, or generally acceptable-techniques and procedures. The alternative is
the determination of social issues by tradition, prejudice, or naked
conflict of interests. Science offers at least the possibility of
harnessing intelligence to the task.
It is most illuminating to note the parallel between the present
debates about the possibility and utility of a genuine social science
and the similar battles in the early history of the natural sciences.
Sir James Jeans, one of the greatest scientists of this century, remarks in his last book that Plato and Aristotle were "two major
disasters" in the history of science.87 He points out that the dead
hand of Aristotle lay heavy on physics for two thousand years.
Scientific progress did not begin until men began to think for
65. See John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry 493 et seq. (1938).
66. Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science c. 1 (1892).
67 Sir James Jeans, The Growth of Physical Science 47 (1947)
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themselves, and until they "began to experiment to discover whether
things were as Aristotle had said, and found they were not."65
Startling as this derogation may seem to those who have only the
classroom veneration for the Greek philosophers, it is based upon
the facts of history which must be obvious to all who can read. As
Bertrand Russell has stated, "Throughout the 2,000 years from
Aristotle to Galileo, no one had thought of finding out whether the
laws of falling bodies were what Aristotle said they were. To
test such statements may seem natural to us, but in Galileo's day
it required genius." 69
To test the statements of accepted and authoritative dogma,
from Galileo's day to our own, has required not only genius but
also courage. From Copernicus to Einstein there has been the
same opposition to every proposal that men should substitute
inquiry for imagination and should rely on evidence rather than
superstition in any new field. For centuries the Copernican theory
was bitterly fought by pious men, of both the Catholic and the
Protestant religions, ,on the grounds that it threatened the very
foundations of faith, religion and morality. 70 The persecution and
punishment of Galileo for teaching that the earth revolves around
the sun are well known. It is not so generally realized that this
unwillingness to accept the empirical methods of science even m
the physical fields was not only fanatically determined but incredibly prolonged. The official ban of the Roman Catholic Church
was not lifted from the Copernican theory until 1822.71 For some
time after their founding, both Yale and Harvard taught the
Ptolemaic and the Copernican theories as equally tenable hypotheses.72 Even in 1873 an ex-president of the American Lutheran
Teacher's Seminary published a book on astronomy arguing that
since truth is to be sought in the Bible, rather than in the works
of scientists, the teachings of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton
must be rejected.73
Although nineteenth century opposition to Copernicus was an
anachronism, the "vested interests" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were more solidly entrenched, more ardent and
just as voluble in opposition to a scientific astronomical hypothesis
as any social group of the present era is to the most radical of
current proposals. We will never know how many curious minds
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 52, 55.
Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science 32-33 (1935).
Id. at 40; Jeans, op. cit. supra note 67, at 130.
Jeans,op. cit. supra note 67, at 134.
Ibid.
Russell, op. cit. supra note 69, at 41.
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had the futility of scientific inquiry revealed to them by the red
glare of the flaming faggots of the auto-da-fe, but the number must
have been large. But the "logic" of the anti-Copernicans was not
rested solely on the stake, the fire, the rack, and the wheel. They
spoke vehemently of the logical "necessity" of the Ptolemaic view
of creation, of the absurdity of the Copernican theory, and of the
"impossibility" of investigating matters established by ecclesiastical authority One of Galileo's colleagues refused to look through
the telescope on the grounds he saw no reason for inquiring into
a matter that had already been settled by Aristotle.74 All of the
present objections against empirical attacks on social problems
have been used many times before, and as often as they have
been used, they have been abandoned.
As late as the middle of the nineteenth century, Dr. Oliver
Wendell Holmes (father of the late Justice) provoked scorn and
indignation among his professional colleagues by suggesting that
they might be responsible for the spread of puerperal fever (or
blood-poisoning) among women in childbirth. Doctors, the indignant among them declared, were gentlemen, and gentlemen had
clean hands, and it was absurd to insinuate that clean hands might
carry disease.75 All the old arguments of tradition, superstition and
supposition against evidence were marshalled and reiterated. Finally it was Semmelweiss, a brilliant and courageous Hungarian
doctor, who persuaded the profession by evidence too overwhelming to be denied that hands clean enough for a drawing room
might still carry sickness to a delivery room. The lives of uncounted millions of women have been saved by the stubborn insistence of Semmelweis that doctors should disinfect their bands
between deliveries."0 For this, the world has paid him homage-posthumously During his lifetime he was called both incompetent
and crazy for daring to challenge the traditional wisdom and mores
of the calling on the basis of nothing more than his personal investigations.
In every field in which human knowledge has advanced, the
story has been the same. Intuitive concepts and accidental practices
seem adequate to primitive man. By repetition, they become habitual, then habit deepens into tradition, and finally tradition becomes
unchallengeable truth. One day some skeptical mind suggests that
perhaps the current version of truth is only tradition, perhaps tradi74. Jeans, op. cit. supra note 67, at 134, 174 et seq.

75. Haggard, op. cit. supra note 59, at 79.
76. Id. at 80-95.
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tion is only ossified habit, and, m any event, the adequacy of both
beliefs and practices to contemporary situations should be tested
by investigation; Immediately all the traditional objections are
made: you can't experiment in this field, investigation is old stuff,
our ancestors have made all the investigations necessary; since
people are involved you can't be objective, this cold-blooded proposal is immoral because it disregards values; and anyway there
are no practical methods of making the investigation. Note that
exactly the same arguments, with slight changes of phraseology,
apply equally whether the subject matter is astronomy(how can
you put a star in a test tube?), physics (Democritus knew all about
atoms), physiology (you can't study men as though they were anibals), psychology (if you don't take account of man's soul you
destroy all our values), or, the most recent child of science,
cybernetics (don't be silly-how can you make a machine that
will think?). Note also that in every case in which we have
disregarded these objections, we have been able to formulate meaningful problems, institute effective techniques, gather valid data,
and finally not only enlarge our useful knowledge but increase our
control over both the environment and ourselves.
The next step forward in the long path of man's progress
must be from jurisprudence (which is mere speculation about
7
law) to jurimetrics"
-which is the scientific investigation of legal
problems. In the field of social control (which is law) we must
at least begin to use the same approach and the same methods
that have enabled us to progress toward greater knowledge and
control in every other field. The greatest problem facing mankind
at this midpoint of the twentieth century is the inadequacy of
socio-legal methods inherited from primitive ancestors to control
a society which, in all other aspects, is based upon the powerful
techniques of a sophisticated science. The inescapable fact is that
jurisprudence bears the same relation to a modem science of
jurimetrics as astrology does to astronomy, alchemy to chemistry,
or phrenology to psychology. It is based upon speculation, supposition and superstition; it is concerned with meaningless questions; and, after more than two thousand years, jurisprudence has
not yet offered a useful answer to any question or a workable
technique for attacking any problem.
77. Of course it is not important what term is used to indicate the
scientific discipline suggested. It is important that it have a distinctive name,
.as well as a general program. The name suggested here seems, to the author,
as good as any, since it seems to indicate the nature of the subject matter, and
corresponds to other similar terms, such as biometrics and econometrcs.
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The utter futility of jurisprudence (as anything more pretentious than classroom or barroom entertainment) can be illustrated by a typical philosophical supposition. Suppose that all
the legal scholars and lawyers in the United States (or in the
world) were to be gathered in a single great conclave the day
after tomorrow and presented with the questions of jurisprudence
What is law? What is the basis of law? What is the end and purpose of law? Define Justice, etcetera etcetera. Now suppose-this is
a great feat of imagination-that all these lawyers should agree
unamimously on answers to all of these questions. We would, at
long last, then have authorative definitions of concepts like law,
justice, and perhaps even of crime, contract, property and tort.
(It is too much to suppose that even this imaginary conclave
should agree on what constitutes a divorce in the United States.)
What would be the result? I venture to suggest it would be
nothing at all. If the results of these deliberations were published
in some Super-Restatement of the Law, they would, no doubt,
be cited by judges (together with Coke, Blackstone and appropriate
cases) in rendering opinions. But, as has already been pointed
out, they would not materially influence the result in any particular
case, and, most assuredly, would furnish neither better methods nor
better answers for any present problems.
Let us continue this supposition one step further. Supposewhat is certainly not impossible-that half a dozen or a dozen
competent young lawyers and professors should decide to address
themselves seriously to jurimetrics. After a year or so of work in
the field, they decide to meet together for the purpose of discussing the problems and results of jurimetrics. A time and place
are arranged and an agenda drawn up. What are the questions
with which jurimetrics is likely to be concerned? It is certainly
impossible to predict, in advance of work in the field, exactly
what form the problems will take. Still, the general form and
probable subject matter of many of the questions which jurimetrics,
at least in its earlier stages, will attempt to investigate can be
anticipated. It is reasonable to suppose that the agenda might be
something like this
The Problems of Jurimetrics
A. The behavior of witnesses
What is the statistical reliability and validity of present scientific
methods of detecting deception?78
78. A substantial amount of work has already been done on the scientific

detection of deception. At least fourteen psychometric methods of detecting
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What is the comparative reliability and validity of crossexamination as a method of testing testimony?
What new or refined techniques will give us better methods of
detecting deception by witnesses?
How can the ability of a witness to observe and recollect be
most easily measured?
deception are known: (1) use of scopolamin, (2) use of sodium am)tal,
(3) hypnotic sleep; (4) measurement of systolic blood pressure; (5)
measurement of rate of respiration, (6) measurement of galvanic reflex,
(7) word association tests; (8) observation of pupillary reflex; (9) measurement of pulse rate; (10) recording of eye-movements; (11) recording of unconscious muscle-movements; (12) measurement of amplitude and rate of
heart beat; (13) analysis of chemical content of blood; (14) change in the
brain-wave patterns. These various measures are of various degrees of
reliability and many of them are interrelated. There is a substantial body
of literature on this subject. Hugo Munsterberg, On the Witness Stand
(1908), W M,. Marston, The Lie Detector Test (1938), Wigmore, Professor Munsteberg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 111. L. Rev. 399
(1909) ; Use of Psychology Tests to Detcrnine Credibility of Witnesses,
33 Yale L. J. 771 (1924); Inbau, Scientific Evidence w Crinzmnal Trials,
24 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1140 (1934) ; .Keeler, Debutking the LieDetector, 25 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 153 (1934) ; Inbau, "The Lie Detector," 40 Scientific Monthly 81 (1935) ; Detection of Deception Techinque
Admitted in Evidence, 26 J. Cnm. L. & Criminology 262, 431, 499 (1935) ;
Bloodhound Evidence, 26 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 926 (1936), Jaycox,
Scientific Detection of Lies, 40 Scientific American 370 (1937) ;Ruckimck,
The Truth About the Lie-Detector, 22 J. of App. Psych. 50 (1938), Obermann, Mild Affective States and the. Berger Rythin, 34 J. of Abnormal &
Social Psych. 84 (1939), Berrien Laboratory Studies of Deception, 24 J.
of Exp. Psych. 542 (1939), Tovillo, History of Lie Detection, 30 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 39 (1939); Forosch, The Lie Detector and the Courts,
16 N. Y. U. L. Q. 202 (1939), Keeler, The Lie Detector Proves Its Usefulness, 22 Public Management 163 (1940) ; Trovillo, What the Lie Detector
Can't Do, 32 J. Grim. L. & Criminology 121 (1941), MacNitt, Electrodermal
Response and Cardiac Amplitude as Measures of Deception, 33 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 266 (1942) ; Trovillo, Deception Test Criteria,33 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 338 (1942), Pupillary Responses during Deception, (1943)
32 J. of Exp. Psych: 443 (1943), 34 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 135 (1941) ;
Turner, Crime Detection, 30 Radio News 20 (1943) ; Johnston, The Magic
Lie Detector, Saturday Evening Post, Apr. 15, p. 9, Apr. 22, p. 26, Apr. 29,
p. 20 (1944), Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses, 36 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 201 (1945). Cases which have considered the legal admissibility
of such techniques are: Frye v. United States, 54 App. D. C. 46, 293 Fed.
1013 (App. D.C. 1923) ; State v. Hudson, 289 S. W. 920 (Mo. 1926) ; State
v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W 314 (1933) ; People v. Kenny, 167 Misc.
51 3 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (1938), People v. Frte, 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d.
31 (1938), rehearing denied, 279 N. Y. 788, 18 N. E. 2d 870 (1939), Commonwealth v. Kipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A. 2d 353 (1939), Commonwealth v.
Jones, 341 Pa. 541,.19 A. 2d 389 (1941) ; People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562,
2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942); LaFevre v. State, 242 Wisc. 416, 8 N. WV. 2d 288
(1943) ; State v. DeHart, 242 Wisc. 562, 8 N. W 2d 360 (1943), Koonts
v. Farmers Mutual Ins. Ass'n, 235 Iowa 87, 16 N. XV. 2d 20 (1944),
Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P 2d 111 (1945).
79. There is a spate of panegyrics on the value of cross-examination,
but no body, of scientific literature comparable to that on psychometric detection of deception. See Stern, The -Psychology of Testimony, 34 J. of
Abnormal & Social Psych. 3 (1939).
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How can the effect of interest or bias upon observation and
recollection be measured?
B.

The behavior of judges
What statistical measures will most conveniently summarize the
behavior of individual judges in various categories of cases? How
can we institute and maintain the basic records for such measures. 80
How, within the framework of existing rules, can we investigate
the behavior of juries, measure their reaction to evidence and instructions, and discover the determinant considerations in reaching
verdicts?x'

On the basis of inquiries relating to the behavior of witnesses,
can we construct any objective criteria for weighing testimony?
How can we adapt the generally recognized scientific measures
of probability to the problems of legal "proof"?
On the basis of data relating to the behavior of persons engaged
in the judging process, are there any observable differences between
the behaviour of judges-in-court, administrative "judges," and
legislators ? If we can discover such differences, how can they best
be expressed qualitatively and quantitively'
C. The behavior of legislators
What practical measures can be instituted for investigating
and recording in summary form the patterns of legislative behavior?
Can reliable patterns of the kind presupposed in the radicalconservative-reactionary terms of popular speech be discovered?
If so, are there similar behavior patterns among "judges"? What
are the measures of such patterns?
To what extent does the behavior of legislators, in legislature
X during period Y, indicate the influence of precedent, evidence,
personal interest, and other factors?
What procedures can be instituted in legislative bodies to secure
80. Frank reports that an attempt to maintain such records in New
York for a few years disclosed results so disconcerting to the judges that
the keeping of the records was discontinued. Jerome Frank, Law and the

Modem Mind 112-115 (1930).

81. Two promising attempts by individual jurists along this line have
been reported recently. See St. Paul Judge Probes Juror's Mind, 6 Bench
and Bar of Minn. 17 (1949) , Hartshorne, Jury Verdicts" A Study of Their
Characteristicsand Trends, 35 A. B. A. J. 113 (1949). These studies suggest
that if some investigators would prepare uniform questionnaire and tabular
forms, many judges might be willing to help gather similar data.
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and -present to the members more representative and reliable
evidence: relating to the subjects under consideration?
To what extent can court and administrative trial procedures
be useful in legislative inquiries? What other procedures are available or can be devised to enable legislators to weigh evidence?
Legal language and communication
What current legal terms have a core of meaning and which
ones become wholly meaningless under semantic analysis?
What operational definitions52 can be given to the meaningful
legal terms?
What semantic devices can be used immediately to make current legal jargon a useful means of communication?
What concepts, and correlative terms, are most useful for communication regarding the data and problems of junmetrics?
What means can be devised and used to make the legal guides
for public action intelligible to the public?
D.

Legal procedure and recordation
How can ordinary controversies be presented to a tribunal in
the simplest and quickest manner? How can the inordinate delays
of current procedure, both in presentation and decision, be eliminated or minimized?
How can business machines and methods be adapted to handle
the problems of filing and making available public records of lawsuits, judgments, land titles, births, deaths, marriages, divorces,
business liens, and other similar materials? How can public records
be made sufficiently available to the public so that "constructive
notice" is more than a legal fiction?
E.

Non-aberrant personal maladjustments
How can the formation of unstable marriage combinations be
prevented or deterred?
How can marital maladjustments be separated into those which
ate capable of being resolved and those which are not?
How can potentially successful marriage combinations be preserved through critical periods of maladjustment in which one or
both parties desire divorce?
F

82. See P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (1927). Also
see references on semantics cited in note 63 mipra.
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How can inherently unsatisfactory and unstable marital combinations be quickly and honestly dissolved without encouraging
emotionally unstable personalities to seek divorce for reasons of
personal whim rather than necessity?
What techniques and institutions can be established to offer
normal opportunities for development to children in situations of
(a) divorce, (b) unmarried parents, and (c) delinquent homes?
G.

Aberrations of behavior
How can aberrant tendencies be detected before serious behavior problems occur?
How can the malleable aberrant be separated from the residual
intransigent, or the incurable psychotic?
What treatment will cure the tendency to aberrations of behavior of types a, b, c,
n, in situations A, B, C,
N?
What methods are most likely to deter the normal, or potentially aberrant, person from anti-social, or illegal, behavior?
H.

Unintentional personal injury
How effective are present "negligence" laws in deterring conduct likely to cause unintentional injury to others? What laws
might be more effective to accomplish this?
How effective are present "negligence" laws in providing for
the needs of persons injured by others? What laws might be more
effective in providing for such needs?
I.

Macrolegal techniques of investigation
What indices will most reliably indicate the social results of
laws in categories A, B, C,
N?
How can the data to construct these indices be obtained most
efficiently?
The contrast between the questions of jurimetrics and the
problems of jurisprudence is patent. Perhaps the most striking
difference is that the problems of jurisprudence are broad, general,
and therefore limited in number, while the questions of jurimetrics
are relatively narrow and specific, and so are much more numerous.
But this is a superficial distinction. The profound differentiation
lies in two facts. First, the problems of jurisprudence are basically
meaningless, since they can only be debated but never decided nor
even investigated, whereas the questions of jurimetrics are mean-
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ingful since they are capable of being investigated, and ultimately
answered, even though we may not know the answers now.3 Second,
the problems of jurisprudence are not truly significant problems,
since even if they were "solved," in the only sense in which they
could be "solved"--by the giving of authoritative definitions, the
"solutions" would have no practical consequences in our lives. On
the other hand, all of the questions of junmetrics are genuinely
significant, since even a partial or tentative answer to any one is
likely to have far-reaching consequences for society and for the
individual. In this sense, jurimetrics is eminently "practical" m its
approach, as contrasted with the philosophical speculations of
jurisprudence.
There are, of course, other differences between the two disciplines, some of which may not be apparent at this time. Certainly
one of the most important is that 'the problems of jurisprudence
are formally "static" problems which presuppose the existence of
one final authoritative answer, while the questions of junmetrics
are "dynamic" in form in that they allow for changing answers
as our knowledge increases. Indeed, in jurimetrics the questions
themselves change as the body of knowledge grows, since the problems are constantly reformulated in terms of prior data. Further, it
will be noticed that while legal theoreticians, like the taditional
economists, have been concerned up to the present time eoxclusively with microlegal phenomena-theories about the application of
law to individuals-jurimetrics takes a broader outlook to inlude also an inquiry into macrolegal phenomena-the effect of
law upon the community. While we can never disregard the problems of the application of law to individuals, e-xperience in many
fields indicates that the macrocosmic approach is more likely to
be a fruitful one in the early stages of scientific investigation. Even
today the science of physics is able to formulate its macroscopic
laws with much greater accuracy than its microscopic laws, andif the Heisenberg principle is correct-there is an absolute limit
to the precision of observation and prediction on the submolecular
level.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of jurimetrics over jurisprudence, at least from the viewpoint of the public, is that it will
establish within the law itself an institutional method for growth
and change. It is true that lawyers and jurists are fond of making
speeches and writing papers lauding the marvelous vitality of
the common law institutions in adapting themselves to social
83. 'See references cited in note 64 stpra.
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change. It is also true that such praise comes almost exclusively
from within the profession and almost always as a defense against
the attacks of non-lawyers upon the immobility and inflexibility
of the law Regardless of the forensic facade with which it may be
decorated, it is too obvious to admit of controversy that the present
method of the law has the effect of making change as slow and
as slight as possible, as well as of making law a completely closed
system which will admit new knowledge only when it is smuggled
in disguised as a "precedent." As in Jhering's juristic heaven, new
facts and ideas can gain admission to the house of law today only
by smashing their heads through the solid walls. Jurimetrics
promises to cut windows in the house of law, so that those inside
can see out, and to cut doors, so that those outside can get in.
Significantly, jurimetrics is oriented neither to change nor permanence as such. It seeks knowledge, and is prepared to retain, discard or modify principles as the data may, in any case, demand.
It seems likely that this approach may at last furnish a satisfactory resolution of the law's eternal paradox that rules which are
too inflexible for social growth are still too uncertain for individual security
It must not be imagined that jurimetrics promises any panaceas.
The story of man's progress is full of nostrums, but devoid of
panaceas, and there is no reason to think that we may discover one
now Jurimetrics promises no more than an opportunity for law
to move forward along the same rocky road that all the other
disciplines have already travelled. It is not an easy nor an inviting road (except for those hardy souls who enjoy pioneering),
but the grim and inescapable fact is that there is no other road
running in the same direction. There are many side-roads, many
well advertised cure-alls on the market appoint all judges; elect
all judges, select better judges, however you do it; let juries decide
everything, abolish all juries, let panels of experts decide all
lawsuits, submit all laws to a popular referendum, call off elections
and turn the government over to the engineers. These are just a
few of the nortrums, but they all have one thing in commonthey all relate to the method of choosing the men who are to
exercise power. Once selected, these officials (or the public) would
be faced with the same problems confronting the men in power
today There is no reason to think that those in power would
behave differently because of a change in the method of their
selection.
It is merely tautological to say that if we select better men for
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judges and legislators we will have better courts and legislatures.
There can be no argument about the proposition that we should
get the best men we possibly can for public office. But this gives
us no hint as to how we may discriminate the well from the poorly
qualified. Furthermore, there is not a scintilla of evidence that it
would, be possible, over any long period of time, to secure public
officials of a greater average competence than those we have been
getting, or, that if we could, the more competent officials could
achieve substantially better results with our present laws and
legal system.
As astute an observer as Judge Frank has intimated that the
way to improve the administration of law is to have more judges
like Justice Holmes."4 Although based on a brilliant analysis, the
suggestion is almost puerile in its naivete. It is equivalent to
saying that science would progress faster if there were more
scientists of the caliber of Newton and Einstein. Perhaps if all
men were truly wise there would be no need for government at
all-such speculation is completely idle. Any useful social theory
must be predicated on the proposition that all men are limited in
wisdom, and most men are very limited. Without unduly flattering
those now in office, it is submitted that, taken on a broad average,
American public officials represent a level of competence and
honesty about as much above the common average as we can
reasonably hope to maintain over any long period of time within
the foreseeable future. It follows that if we are to make any
important advance in the business of government we must find new
methods and techniques of making and admnimstering law. When
our government officials have new tools with which to work we
may expect them to achieve some real improvement in results;
until then, the cry for better men will remain a pious, but ultimately
futile, exhortation.
However, this conclusion is no extenuation of the backwardness of the bar. Lack of tools may be a good defense to a charge of
incompetence, but not of indifference. There is a widespread dissatisfaction with our system of laws, and even more, of lawyers.
The shortcomings of the legal system can hardly be denied, nor
the responsibility of the profession for them escaped. In the face
of this, the proposals of the bar associations to raise large sums
of money for a program of "public relations" are inane. Advertis84. Judge Frank does not make this conclusion explicit, but it seems
to be the obvious inference. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 253
et seq. (1930).
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ing is no substitute for research. 5 Whether the lawyers like it or
not, knowledge will eventually encroach upon ignorance and research replace speculation as a basis for law If the legal profession wants to retain its position as the nexus of the social system,
it must develop techniques adapted to the modern problems of
that system, and it must begin at once. If it does not do this,
most surely it will be replaced in function by other more competent groups. In fact, the process has already begun. Those more
competent to use the statistical tools of modern economics are
beginning to take over the fields of taxation and rate-making,
those more competent with the tools of psychology are threatening to take over the fields of delinquency and domestic relations.
The large field of industrial risks and workmen's compensation
is largely lost to the legal profession because of its refusal to
abandon traditional common law ideas. Patent law has become a
specialty requiring considerable engineering training in addition
to the normal legal education, and therefore is closed to most
lawyers. Numerous other divisions of law are beginning to develop in the same way Neither private nor public wailing will
halt this trend. Unless the lawyers acquire new skills they will
become mere clerks and scriveners. In history's tomorrow, the
possession of merely forensic skill will not even be considered a
professional accomplishment. Advertising can no more maintain
the prestige of antique abilities and outmoded learning than it
can make a basic industry out of buggy-whip manufacturing in an
automotive age.
The basic lesson which lawyers must learn, as the scientist
William Vogt has recently pointed out, is that "we need to know
what we are dong."s6 There may have been a time when righteousness and good intentions were a sufficient guide to proper conduct. If so, that time is long since past. It requires not only good
intentions but a great deal of knowledge for man to orient himself
amid the complexities of the modern world. To gain knowledge
requires constant inquiry The price of progress is eternal change,
the price of wisdom is eternal doubt. These may seem like high
prices, but they are no greater than they have been in the past,
and always before there have been those who were willing to pay
the price for the privilege of contributing to mankind's knowledge
85. Needless to say, the term "research" is here used in its scientific
sense, and what is carelessly called "legal research" by the average lawyer
has no more relation to it than numerology has to statistics.
86. William Vogt, Road to Survival 141 (1948)
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and progress. If the legal profession is willing to abandon the
comfortable closed room of jurisprudence and philosophical speculation for the rocky open road of jurimetrics and scientific investigation, then it will deserve and get the respect of all men. If not,
then it will deserve, and ultimately get assignment to the same
limbo that holds the alchemists and necromancers and other practitioners of man's forgotten superstitions.
More inportant than the status of any group, however, is the
destiny of society. If jurimetrics were no more than a means of
maintaining or restoring the position and prestige of the bar, then
it would be of only professional interest and parochial importance.
But it is much more than that. It is, in sum, the doctrine that the
methods of scientific inquiry should be extended to every phase
of human activity which is of concern to society. It is based upon
the premise that democracy includes the right of citizens to be
informed about those matters which they are ultimately supposed
to control through their choice of officials, and upon the conclusion that reliable information has been and can be obtained only
by free and competitive inquiry with the methods of science. As
science itself has contributed to the growth of freedom, and, in
turn, requires freedom in order to flourish, so will jurimetrics
grow out of democracy yet strengthen and broaden democracy as
it grows. Ignorance is the ally of tyranny, for despotisms great and
small are authoritarian in that they coerce belief in order to
compel obedience. Knowledge and free inquiry are the basis of
democracy, since free men can be brought into agreement only by
persuasion, and this depends upon demonstrations which satisfy
the contemporary tests for truth. Ours is a rational age believing in
pragmatic tests; it will not much longer be content to take speculative answers based on ancient authority to its most vital questions.
There will always be those who will scoff at the idea that law
can be put on a rational basis as visionary. Let us admit that this
proposal is improbable. The most that can be said is that it is
just as improbable as the possibility that the weak and stupid
creature we call man will survive much longer on an insignificant
speck of dust whirling madly about in the finite but unbounded
reaches of a vast and expanding universe. It is just exactly as
improbable as that, for it is the indispensable condition of such
survival.

